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INTRODUCTION 
Norms govern actions in all walks of life. For better or worse, we are capable of violating 
these norms and do so frequently. When we do break the rules, we are criticisable for 
breaking them. Sometimes, we are even deserving of blame. However, the latter is not 
always the case. Often enough we violate rules and still walk free of blame. The 
compulsive and small children are paradigm cases of blameless violators of norms.  
 While it is widely accepted that norms can be violated blamelessly, and while 
there is a pretty reasonable understanding of when this happens implicit in the literature, 
there are few if any explicit accounts.1 This paper supplies this lack. Its first main 
ambition is to develop a normative framework for action in general including detailed 
accounts of criticisability, blamelessness and blameworthiness (section 1).  
 A specific type of action that has received a considerable amount of attention in 
recent epistemology is the speech act of assertion. Assertion is an action. And since 
actions in general are governed by norms, it will come as no big surprise that assertion 
makes no exception on this front. However, it is widely agreed that there is a norm 
associated with assertion in particular. More specifically, it is thought that there is an 
epistemic norm governing assertion. This means that there is such a thing as epistemic 
permissibility and impermissibility for assertion. In particular, it is often thought that 
assertion is governed by a rule of the following form: 
 
 The C Rule of Assertion 
 One must: assert that p only if p has C.2  
 
While many contributors to the debate on norms of assertion subscribe to The C Rule of 
Assertion, there is no consensus on the identity of the crucial property C. According to 
the perhaps most prominent account, C is the property of being known by the speaker. In 
other words, 
 
 The Knowledge Rule of Assertion (KRA) 
 One must: assert that p only if one knows that p.3  
 
We accept KRA. Our second aim in this paper is to apply the normative framework to the 
case of assertion. We will argue that this allows its champions to defuse a prominent line 
of objection against KRA, which ventures to show that KRA’s knowledge requirement 
on permissible assertion is too strong (section 2).  
Finally, we will go even one step further and provide reason to believe that the 
argument against KRA can be turned on its head. With the normative framework from 
section 1 in play (and given a couple of further plausible assumptions), the cases that are 
supposed to show that KRA is too strong can be shown to confirm KRA and to 
disconfirm rival views.  
 I. CRITICISMS AND BLAME: A BASIC NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK 
I.1.	  Criticisability	  and	  Norm-­‐Specific	  Blamelessness.	   It is widely acknowledged 
in the literature that a permissible action is a blameless action. This applies at the level of 
specific norms such as the rule of Uno requiring players to call Uno when playing their 
penultimate card. If you do call Uno when playing your penultimate card, your action is 
permissible by this norm and so blameless relative to this norm.  
 Consider next a situation in which a particular norm is violated. Say, you played 
your penultimate card without calling Uno. You violated a rule of Uno. If so, you can, of 
course, be prima facie legitimately criticised for violating this norm. In the Uno case, we 
may do this for instance by saying: “You didn’t call Uno!” 
Even so, it may be that you violate a norm and yet you are blameless for so doing. 
If so, you are also, of course, blameless relative to this norm. More specifically, there are 
three ways in which this may happen. 
 One way of blamelessly violating a particular norm is through overriding.4 This 
happens when the requirements of the norm you are violating are in conflict with the 
requirements of another norm that takes precedence in the situation. For instance, 
suppose you are playing a game of Uno and are required by the rules of Uno to call Uno 
when playing your next card. Suppose, at the same time, someone will kill your 
neighbour if you do so. What the rules of Uno require of you is in conflict with the 
requirements of moral norms, which take precedence here. In other words, moral norms 
override the rules of Uno. When, because of this, you go on to violate the rules of Uno, 
you do so blamelessly.  
The second way of blamelessly violating a norm is by violating it because5 your 
action is not under your control. Suppose, for instance, that you have been brainwashed 
by your guru not to call Uno when playing your penultimate card. Here you violate the 
rule but are clearly blameless for doing so. 
Finally, the third way manifests itself in situations in which you violate a norm 
because you are unaware that this is what you are doing.6 Suppose, for instance, that you 
are unaware that the rules of Uno require you to call Uno when playing your penultimate 
card. As a result, you do not do so. In this case you violate a rule of Uno. Again, you are 
blameless for doing so. Ignorance excuses also.  
With regard to the second and the third way of blamelessly violating a norm, 
some qualifications are needed. To see why, suppose that you knew that you would 
undergo brainwashing were you to go back to your guru. You had also promised not to 
go back. However, you went anyway. The impermissible act you are made to perform 
may be out of your control. Even so, you are blameworthy (see below) for another act, 
going back to your guru, of which the impermissible act is a consequence. As a result, 
you are not blameless for violating the rule of Uno. Strictly speaking, then, lack of 
control excuses only when it is itself blameless. 
Similarly, suppose that, in our toy case, you had promised to read up on the rules 
of Uno before playing but did not do so. In this case, you are unaware of the relevant rule 
of Uno. Even so, you are blameworthy for another act (in this case an omission), your 
failure to read up on the rules of Uno, of which your failure to call Uno is a consequence. 
As a result you are not blameless for not calling Uno. Strictly speaking, then, ignorance 
excuses only when it is itself blameless.7 
 In sum, then, we want to propose the following account of blamelessness with 
respect to specific norms: 
 
 Norm-Specific Criticisability 
An agent is prima facie legitimately criticisable relative to a specific norm N for 
ϕ-ing iff ϕ-ing violates N 
 
Norm-Specific Blamelessness 
An agent is blameless relative to a specific norm N for ϕ-ing iff 
(1)  ϕ-ing is permissible by N or  
(2) ϕ-ing violates N but the agent ϕs  
(2.a)  in order to comply with the requirements of a (non-overridden) 
overriding norm or  
(2.b)  because this is blamelessly out of her control or  
(2.c)  because the agent is blamelessly ignorant that ϕ-ing violates N. 
 
On this account, an action can be criticisable relative to a specific norm and, at the same 
time, blameless relative to that very same norm. While this may look odd at first sight, on 
reflection, it is entirely as it should be. Actions are often performed in the public sphere 
and, as such, are observable by others, who may pick up the forms of behaviour 
exhibited. When you fail to call Uno when playing your penultimate card and so violate a 
rule of the game, this may be observed by someone else who will pick up your behaviour 
and, as a result, may violate the rule in the future, too. By allowing for criticisms of 
actions that violate specific norms we can work against the spread of norm-violating 
forms of behaviour. Since this is a good thing, it makes sense for us to allow for such 
criticisms. At the same time, we may also want to grant that a norm has been broken 
blamelessly by the agent. We do not want to hold the norm violation against her: she was 
blamelessly ignorant, things were blamelessly out of control and so on. If so, there is 
excellent reason for us to allow criticisability relative to a specific norm and 
blamelessness relative to the very same norm to coexist.8 
I.2. All-Things Considered Blamelessness and Blameworthiness. Thus far we have 
looked at the blamelessness of an action with respect to specific norms. However, it is 
common to distinguish between assessments of actions with respect to specific norms and 
all-things-considered assessments of actions. All-things-considered assessments take into 
account the entire normative profile of an action and assesses whether the action was 
permissible, required, or forbidden in view of its entire normative profile. Unsurprisingly, 
then, just as an action can be blameless relative to a specific norm, it can also be all-
things-considered blameless. For that reason we now want to extend the above account to 
all-things-considered blamelessness.  
 An action is all-things-considered blameless if it is all-things-considered 
permissible. There are, in turn, two ways in which this can happen.  
 First, an action is all-things-considered permissible if it is permissible by all the 
specific norms that apply to it (henceforth also fully permissible for short). Suppose you 
call Uno when playing your penultimate card and thus comply with the rules of Uno. 
Suppose, in addition, you do not thereby violate any practical and moral norms and that 
no other norms apply to your act. Then your calling Uno is all-things-considered 
permissible. 
 Second, an action is all-things considered permissible if it is permissible by all 
(non-overridden) overriding norms that apply to it. Suppose you do not call Uno when 
playing your penultimate card and thus violate a rule of Uno. Suppose, in addition, you 
violate a practical norm in so doing: you will be punished and are less likely to win. At 
the same time, your neighbour will die if you call Uno and so calling Uno is prohibited 
by moral norms. Suppose there are no further norms applying to your action. In order to 
save your neighbour’s life, you do not call Uno. In this case, your action is all-things-
considered permissible. The moral norms override the norms of Uno and the practical 
norms (without being themselves overridden by further norms) and your not calling Uno 
is permissible by the moral norms.  
 To repeat, what we have seen now are two ways in which an action can be all-
things-considered blameless in virtue of being all-things-considered permissible. That 
said, even an action that is all-things-considered impermissible can be all-things-
considered blameless. What we want to suggest is that an all-things-considered 
impermissible action is all-things-considered blameless if the action is blameless relative 
to all specific norms that apply to it. Suppose that you play your penultimate card without 
calling Uno. However, this is because you are blamelessly unaware that there is a rule 
requiring to you call Uno when playing your penultimate card. Suppose that your action 
is permissible by moral and practical norms and that there are no further norms applying 
to your action. In this case, you are all-things-considered blameless for not calling Uno. 
Since your act is permissible by moral and practical norms, it is blameless relative to 
these norms. Since you do not call Uno because you are blamelessly unaware that there is 
a rule requiring you to do so, you are blameless relative to this rule. Since these are all the 
rules that apply to your action in this case, your action is blameless relative to all specific 
norms that apply to it. So, it is all-thing-considered blameless.  
 Finally, an agent is blameworthy if and only if she is not all-things-considered 
blameless.  
 In sum, we want to propose the following: 
 
 All-Things-Considered Blamelessness 
 An agent is all-things-considered blameless for ϕ-ing iff 
(1)  ϕ-ing is all-things-considered permissible (that is, either fully permissible or 
permissible by all (non-overridden) overriding norms that apply to it) or 
(2)  ϕ-ing is all-things-considered impermissible but the agent’s ϕ-ing is 
blameless relative to all specific norms that apply to it. 
 
 All-Things-Considered Criticisability/Blameworthiness 
An agent is blameworthy for ϕ-ing iff she is not all-things considered blameless 
for ϕ-ing.  
 
It may be worth noting that, according to this account, criticisability occurs at the level of 
assessments by specific norms. In this way, it is fine-grained, as it were. In contrast, 
blameworthiness occurs at the level of all-things-considered assessments and so is 
coarse-grained. Blamelessness can occur at both levels.  
 This completes our normative framework for criticisability, blamelessness, and 
blameworthiness. We would like to emphasise once more that this is a perfectly general 
framework, in the sense that it applies to action in general. That said, in what follows, we 
would like to apply the framework to a particular type of act, to wit the speech act of 
assertion. More specifically, we will first look at a famous problem for KRA and then 
show that the above framework serves to offer an appealing solution to it. 
 
II. AN APPLICATION: ASSERTION 
II.1. The Case Against KRA. There is a prominent line of argument aiming to 
show that KRA is mistaken. More specifically, it ventures to show that KRA’s 
knowledge requirement on assertion is too strong. In order to achieve this, foes of KRA 
adduce cases in which a speaker is said to make a permissible assertion, whilst not 
knowing what they assert. Crucially, evidence that the assertion is permissible is 
supposed to reside in the fact that the relevant speakers are not deserving of criticism or 
alternatively that they are blameless. Here are some characteristic statements of the 
argumentative strategy: 
 
I shall show that there are cases in which a speaker asserts that p in the absence of 
knowing that p without being subject to criticism in any relevant sense, thereby 
showing that knowledge cannot be what is required for proper assertion.9  
 
[I]f breaching a rule makes one blameworthy, which typically it does, then, [in the 
relevant cases], on the knowledge account, the asserter comes out as being 
blameworthy, contrary to intuition.10  
 
The classical cases that foes of KRA have adduced against KRA are cases in which 
speakers assert (i) justified false beliefs and (ii) gettiered beliefs as well as (iii) cases of 
selfless assertion. By way of illustration, consider the following examples: 
 
1. Assertion on justified false belief 
FAKE SNOW. “[I]t is winter, and it looks exactly as it would if there were snow 
outside, but in fact that white stuff is not snow but foam put there by a film crew of 
whose existence I have no idea … [I] assert that there is snow outside.”11 
 
2. Assertion on gettiered belief 
FAKE BARNS. “[S]uppose that Wendy correctly sees the only real barn that, 
unbeknownst to her, is completely surrounded by barn facades and asserts to me 
‘There was a barn in the field we just passed’ on this basis.”12  
 
3. Selfless assertions 
CREATIONIST TEACHER. “Stella is a devoutly Christian fourth-grade teacher […] 
Part of this faith includes a belief in the truth of creationism and, accordingly, a belief 
in the falsity of evolutionary theory. Despite this, Stella fully recognizes that there is 
an overwhelming amount of scientific evidence against both of these beliefs […] 
[S]he regards her duty as a teacher to include presenting material that is best 
supported by the available evidence, which clearly includes the truth of evolutionary 
theory. As a result, while presenting her biology lesson today, Stella asserts to her 
students, ‘Modern day Homo sapiens evolved from Homo erectus,’ though she 
herself neither believes nor knows this proposition.”13  
 
In all of these cases, the agents are said not to be subject to criticism or not to be 
blameworthy. Since they violate KRA, it would seem that KRA makes incorrect 
predictions about these cases. Hence KRA is in trouble.  
Before moving on, we would like to point out that, having mentioned cases of 
selfless assertion, we would like to set them aside for the remainder of this paper. The 
reason for this is that we are primarily interested in the normative framework from 
section 1 and the work it can do for champions of KRA. And while, as we are about to 
argue, the framework does offer an attractive treatment of cases involving assertions of 
justified false beliefs and gettiered beliefs, it does not serve to deal with cases of selfless 
assertions. Now, one might wonder whether this does not just mean that KRA stands 
refuted and that any positive results concerning the other problem cases for KRA the 
framework may deliver are of negligible interest. Fortunately, the answer to both of these 
question is no. The reason why the results of this section are not negligible is that cases 
involving assertions of justified false beliefs and gettiered beliefs are still widely 
considered to constitute one of the major stumbling stones for KRA. As a result, any 
successful defense of KRA will have to provide a workable treatment of them. This 
section takes on this task. To see that it does not follow that KRA stands refuted, note 
that even if the normative framework does not serve to handle cases of selfless assertion, 
all that follows is that it does not solve all of KRA’s problems. It remains entirely open to 
champions of KRA to combine the account of assertions of justified false beliefs and 
gettiered beliefs we will offer below with a different treatment of cases of selfless 
assertions. And there are a number of promising candidates in the literature.14 With cases 
of selfless assertion thus safely set aside, let us take a closer look at cases involving 
assertions of justified false beliefs and gettiered beliefs. 
II.2. The Blamelessness Response. Champions of KRA often argue that speakers 
who assert justified false beliefs and gettiered beliefs violate KRA but do so blamelessly. 
In particular, they point out that when in doing something one breaks a norm because one 
reasonably believes that what one does is permissible, then one is blameless. Since this is 
the case with agents in cases like FAKE SNOW and FAKE BARNS, these agents are 
blameless. These speakers assert what they assert because they reasonably believe that 
they know what they assert and, in consequence, that they are permitted to assert as they 
do. If so, it is reasonable for them to believe that they satisfy KRA. As a result, they are 
blameless when asserting as they do.  
However, there are problems with this account. For instance, it may be that there 
are unsophisticated speakers who do not even have the concept of knowledge. They, too, 
may be in cases in which they assert justified false beliefs or gettiered beliefs. Since they 
do not have the concept of knowledge, they are not in a position to host reasonable 
beliefs about knowledge in the first place. As a result, the envisaged explanation of why 
agents in cases like FAKE SNOW and FAKE BARNS are blameless will not work 
here.15  
 At a more general level, foes of KRA worry that the above response is ad hoc. 
Here is one very clear expression of this worry: 
 [A] general worry with excuse maneuvers is that they form very generic ways of 
immunizing proposed norms. Without a principled account of when an agent is 
excused, every counterexample to a norm may be rebutted by upholding that the 
agent is excused from violating the norm. As we have seen, the proponents of 
[KRA] have yet to provide a viable principled account of excusability.16  
 
The normative framework of section 1 offers exactly what Gerken claims champions of 
KRA are missing. If the framework predicts that the speakers in cases like FAKE SNOW 
and FAKE BARNS (as well as their unsophisticated counterparts) are indeed blameless, 
the ad hoc-ness worry can be laid to rest. The blamelessness response will clearly be 
available to champions of KRA. Let us ask whether we get the desired results. 
 First, Norm-Specific Blamelessness entails that an agent is blameless relative to a 
specific norm N for ϕ-ing if ϕ-ing violates N but the agent ϕs because the agent is 
blamelessly ignorant that ϕ-ing violates N. There are a number of ways in which one can 
be blameless for violating a specific norm in virtue of being blamelessly ignorant that one 
is doing so. One such way is if one does what one does because of a reasonable belief 
that what one is doing is permissible. If one believes that what one is doing is 
permissible, then one does not believe that one is violating a norm. If so, one is ignorant 
of the fact that one is violating a norm. If one’s belief is reasonable, then one’s ignorance 
is blameless. (2.c) is satisfied. And, of course, this is exactly what champions of KRA 
have claimed is going on in cases like FAKE SNOW and FAKE BARNS. The speakers 
assert out of a reasonable belief that they know and so that asserting is permissible. This 
means that they are blamelessly ignorant for their assertions.  
While acting out of a reasonable belief that what one does is permissible is one 
route to blameless ignorance, it is not the only route. Others are available as well. To see 
this, recall our Uno case in which you are just blamelessly unaware of the fact that there 
is a rule requiring you to call Uno when playing your penultimate card. In this case you 
may have no belief either way on whether you are complying with the rules of Uno.17 So 
it is not as if you play in the way you do because of a reasonable belief that this is 
permissible. Rather, you blamelessly have no belief on the relevant rule of Uno 
whatsoever. Thus, according to the above framework, another way to blameless 
ignorance is via a blameless lack of belief concerning the relevant rules. And this is of 
course exactly what we find with cognitively unsophisticated agents, such as agents who 
do not even have the concept of knowledge to begin with. Any such agent is incapable of 
even representing KRA. If they are blameless for not having this concept, as they 
typically will be, they, too, will satisfy (2.c) and so come out blameless for violating 
KRA.  
What comes to light, then, is that the envisaged response by champions of KRA is 
borne out by the normative framework from section 1. Moreover, the framework also 
delivers the right results for Gerken’s cases of assertions by cognitively unsophisticated 
agents. As a result, not only is the blamelessness response available to them, the worry of 
ad hoc-ness is addressed also.18  
 
III. THE CASE FOR KRA 
III.1. An Argument for KRA. It comes to light, then, that the blamelessness 
response can be made to work for KRA. As a result, cases like FAKE SNOW and FAKE 
BARNS do not constitute evidence against KRA after all. However, on reflection, the 
normative framework not only allows champions of KRA to successfully defuse an 
objection against KRA. Rather, it serves to turn the tables on foes of KRA. Let us 
explain. 
To begin with, recall that the framework distinguishes between norm-specific 
criticisability and blameworthiness. What we have seen is that, in cases like FAKE 
SNOW and FAKE BARNS, speakers are blameless for violating KRA in particular. 
Moreover, in versions of the cases that might constitute a problem for KRA, they are also 
all-things-considered blameless (see footnote 9). But it is of course entirely compatible 
with this that speakers in these cases are criticisable for violating KRA. If it can be shown 
that they are, these cases will confirm KRA and disconfirm rival views according to 
which the speakers’ assertions comply with the relevant norm. 
Now, it might be thought that it will be difficult if not impossible to ascertain 
whether the speakers in these cases are indeed criticisable for violating KRA. On second 
thought, however, the prospects are not so dim. Given that Norm-Specific Criticisability 
holds, we may expect that we may criticise the agent by pointing out that she violates N. 
One way of achieving this, in turn, is by saying “You don’t …!” where “…” specifies a 
requirement of the norm. This gives us  
 
 You Don’t Criticisms 
An agent whose ϕ-ing violates a specific norm N can be prima facie legitimately 
criticised by saying “You don’t …!”, where “…” is specifies a requirement of N. 
 
For instance, in our toy case, we can with prima facie legitimacy criticise Uno players 
who do not call Uno when playing their penultimate card by saying: “You didn’t call 
Uno!” or “You didn’t say anything!” 
 Moreover, given that Norm-Specific Blamelessness holds, we may expect there to 
be a number of appropriate responses to “You don’t …!” criticisms. For instance, the 
agent may disagree and maintain that she really does satisfy the relevant requirement and 
so her action is permissible, thus satisfying condition (1). Alternatively, she may offer an 
explanation to the effect that the norm was overridden by another norm (2.a), such that 
the action is all-things-considered permissible. We may also expect excuses pointing out 
(blameless) lack of control (2.b) or ignorance (2.c) to be an appropriate form of response. 
And given that a norm was violated, it should come as no surprise that apologies 
constitute an appropriate form of response also. 
 Specific norms are thus associated with specific kinds of appropriate response. In 
particular, 
 
 Appropriate Responses 
Prima facie legitimate “You don’t …!” criticisms make a certain kind of response 
on the part of the defendant prima facie appropriate, including (i) “I did …!” 
rebuttals, (ii) explanations invoking overriding norms, excuses appealing to 
(blameless) (iii) lack of control or (iv) ignorance, and (v) apologies. 
 Let us assume that KRA is true. In conjunction with You Don’t Criticisms and 
Appropriate Responses this assumption delivers a number of predictions. The first one is 
that assertions can prima facie legitimately be criticised by saying “You don’t know 
that!”, “That’s not true!”, “You don’t believe that yourself!” and so on. Of course, 
champions of KRA have long pointed out that this is exactly what we find.19 Interestingly 
enough, it is also what we find in cases like FAKE SNOW and FAKE BARNS. In FAKE 
SNOW, Williamson’s assertion can prima facie legitimately be criticised by saying 
“That’s false! What you are seeing is just foam. There’s a film crew shooting outside.” 
Similarly, in FAKE BARNS, Wendy’s assertion can prima facie legitimately be criticised 
by saying “You don’t know that! This part of the country is peppered with fake barns.”  
Another prediction that we get is that in cases in which a prima facie legitimate 
“You don’t …!” criticism has been levelled against a speaker, appropriate responses 
include “I do …!” rebuttals, explanations in terms of overriding norms, excuses appealing 
to (blameless) lack of control or ignorance, and apologies. And again this is exactly what 
we find. “I do know that!” is prima facie appropriate as is “He was going to shoot me if I 
had told the truth,” “I couldn’t help it,” “I didn’t know,” and “I’m sorry.” For instance, in 
both FAKE SNOW and FAKE BARNS, an apology and/or an excuse is entirely 
appropriate. It will be entirely appropriate to respond by saying “I’m sorry. I didn’t know 
that.” In this way, the putatively problematic cases for KRA, in conjunction with You 
Don’t Criticisms and Appropriate Responses serve to confirm the assumption that KRA 
is true.20  
With these points in play, we would like to look at actions that are not constrained 
by certain normative requirements. In particular, we would like to focus on action types 
that are not governed by a rule to the effect that one must: ϕ only if one satisfies C. We 
would like to suggest the following here: 
 
Illegitimate Criticisms 
If we criticise an agent who φs without satisfying C, perhaps by a “You don’t 
…!” criticism, our criticism will be prima facie illegitimate.  
 
For instance, there is no rule of Uno that one must call Duo when playing one’s 
antepenultimate card. Suppose we are playing a game of Uno and we ventured to criticise 
your antepenultimate move by saying “You didn’t call Duo!” In this case our criticism 
will be prima facie illegitimate. 
Unsurprisingly, then, what is called for by way of response in this kind of case is 
not of the kind appropriate in cases of legitimate criticisms. There is no need for you to 
apologise, offer an excuse or explanation and so on. Rather, you may prima facie 
legitimately rebut the criticism as misplaced. “So what?” is prima facie a perfectly 
legitimate response on your part. What we want to suggest, then, is the following: 
 
Legitimate Rebuttals 
If we criticise an agent who φs without satisfying C, perhaps by a “You don’t 
…!” criticism, the agent can prima facie legitimately rebut our criticism as 
misplaced or irrelevant, perhaps by saying “So what?”. 
 Let us assume now that the action type assertion is not governed by KRA. In particular, 
let us assume that FAKE SNOW and FAKE BARNS are counterexamples to KRA. In 
this case, we get the following predictions, this time via Illegitimate Criticisms and 
Legitimate Rebuttals: criticisms of the speakers for asserting what they do not know are 
(i) prima facie illegitimate and (ii) can prima facie legitimately be rebutted as irrelevant 
or misplaced in these cases. Crucially, however, this is just not what we find. Suppose, 
for instance, in FAKE SNOW, we criticise Williamson’s assertion by saying: “That’s 
false! What you are seeing is fake snow produced by a film crew that’s shooting outside.” 
Our criticism is not prima facie illegitimate in this case. And it cannot be prima facie 
legitimately rebutted as misplaced or irrelevant. For instance, “So what?” is not a prima 
facie legitimate response to our criticism. The same is true of FAKE BARNS. Suppose 
we criticise Wendy by saying: “You don’t know that! This part of the country is peppered 
with fake barns.” Again, our criticism is not prima facie illegitimate and cannot be prima 
facie legitimately rebutted as misplaced or irrelevant. “So what?” is again not a prima 
facie legitimate response here. The assumption that the above cases do indeed constitute 
counterexamples to KRA in conjunction with Illegitimate Criticisms and Legitimate 
Rebuttals leads to incorrect predictions. As a result, we find this assumption 
disconfirmed. 
III.2. Objections and Replies. Before closing, we would like to briefly consider a 
couple of data that might be thought to be problematic for KRA.21 First, when our 
assertions are challenged by asking “How do you know?”, don’t we frequently respond 
by citing our evidence for what we asserted? And doesn’t that support something like the 
justification rule for assertion rather than KRA?  
By way of response to this worry, note first that the fact that we frequently 
respond to “How do you know?” challenges by citing our evidence is just what we may 
expect if KRA is true. After all, given that “How do you know?” constitutes a challenge 
to a speaker’s assertion, the speaker would want to provide some evidence that she knows 
what she asserted. But of course, one excellent way of achieving this is by offering her 
evidence for what she asserted. Suppose, for instance, that you assert that Obama cried 
during his speech on gun violence in January 2016, and we challenge your assertion by 
asking how you know. If KRA is true, your response to our challenge had better produce 
some evidence that you know that Obama cried during the speech in question. One 
excellent way of providing such evidence is by citing your evidence for it, say that you 
saw him crying on a TV broadcast of the speech. But given that citing our evidence is an 
excellent way of producing the kind of evidence “How do you know?” challenges call 
for, it will come as no surprise that we should frequently do so in response to such 
challenges.22 
What is more, it may be worth noting that “How do you know?” challenges are 
standardly taken to support KRA.23 After all, these challenges do presuppose that the 
speaker knows. If KRA were not in place, it is hard to see why this presupposition should 
be legitimate and why assertions should be challengeable in this way to begin with. In 
view of these considerations, we do not think that the fact that we frequently respond to 
“How do you know?” challenges by citing our evidence disconfirms KRA.  
But perhaps the point is a slightly different one, to wit, that the fact that we 
frequently respond to “How do you know?” challenges by citing our evidence provides 
reason to believe that, at the end of the day, “How do you know?” challenges are really 
nothing more than “What’s your justification?” challenges. That might be a bit more 
troublesome for champions of KRA as, on this assumption, all that may be presupposed 
by these challenges is that the speaker has justification for what she asserted. 
Fortunately, there is reason to believe that even this way of interpreting the 
objection will not refute KRA. To see why, note first that since knowledge entails 
justification, on KRA, we may expect that we can challenge assertions by challenging the 
speaker’s justification. In order to turn this into a genuine problem for KRA, it would 
additionally have to be shown that assertions cannot be challenged in any of the other 
ways KRA would predict. And this is exactly not what we find. On the contrary, we can 
also challenge assertions by asking: “Is that really true?” or “Do you really believe that?” 
Moreover, we can also challenge them by querying whether the speaker’s epistemic 
environment is not inhospitable. For instance, Wendy’s assertion that there is a barn in 
the field can be challenged by saying: “But isn’t this the part of the country that contains 
nearly only fake barns?” (In fact, given that assertions can be criticised by saying “That’s 
false!” and so on, it is unsurprising that it should also be possible to challenge them in 
these ways.) So, even if “How do you know?” challenges did ultimately boil down to 
“What’s your justification?” challenges, this fact again does not serve to disconfirm 
KRA.  
Here is another potentially troublesome datum for KRA. Suppose, before there 
was widespread consensus among expert scientists on the reality of global warming, you 
assert that global warming is happening and we criticise your assertion by saying: “You 
don’t know that! There still is a considerable number of scientists who would disagree.” 
Now suppose you reply along the following lines: “Well, okay… But still there is good 
reason to believe that it is.”24 Isn’t this exactly the kind of “I do…” response that, 
according to Appropriate Responses, constitutes a legitimate rebuttal of our criticism? If 
so, KRA is in trouble. After all, as you also concede, you do not know that what you 
assert. If, nonetheless, you can legitimately rebut our criticism here, there is evidence that 
permissible assertion does not require knowledge, that is, that KRA does not hold. 
Fortunately for champions of KRA, there is reason to think that your response 
does not constitute a legitimate rebuttal of our criticism. To see why, note first that 
assertions that go unchallenged become part of the common ground of the conversation 
afterwards, as do assertions such that any challenge/criticism has been successfully met. 
If so, and if, in the above exchange, your response to our criticism is indeed a legitimate 
rebuttal, we may expect that the proposition that global warming is happening to become 
part of the conversation’s common ground thereafter, at least assuming, as we may, that 
neither the original assertion nor the subsequent rebuttal are subject to any further 
challenges or criticisms. Crucially, however, this is not what is happening here. To see 
this, note that (i) subsequent assertions in the conversation cannot be defended by 
referring back to the proposition that global warming is happening, not even if they are 
obviously entailed by it. Moreover, (ii) attempted such defences can themselves be 
legitimately rebutted. For instance, suppose at a later stage you were to assert: 
“Temperatures on Earth are on the rise.” Suppose that we also criticised this assertion and 
that you attempted to defend your assertion by referring back to the earlier assertion that 
global warming is happening, for instance by saying: “But didn’t we already say that 
global warming is happening?” We could rightly point out here that the answer is 
negative: “No, all that we said was that there is good reason to believe that global 
warming is happening.” There is thus reason to believe that the proposition that global 
warming is happening does not become part of the common ground after our exchange. 
But if your response to us had been a legitimate rebuttal, it would have done so. As a 
result, there is reason to believe that your response did not constitute a legitimate rebuttal. 
Finally, there is another, more attractive interpretation of what is going on in our 
exchange. Rather than constituting a legitimate rebuttal of our criticism, your reply 
involves both a concession “Well okay…” and subsequent weakening “There is good 
reason to believe that global warming is happening” of the assertion. This interpretation 
avoids the problem of its competitor. After all, it at most predicts that the proposition that 
there is good reason to believe that global warming is happening becomes part of the 
conversation’s common ground, which seems unproblematic. At the same time, this 
interpretation does not generate a problem for KRA. This is because if we drop the claim 
that your response constitutes a legitimate rebuttal of our criticism, we no longer have 
any reason against KRA’s key claim that permissible assertion requires knowledge. On 
the more plausible interpretation of the case, then, KRA walks free once again.  
 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have developed a normative framework featuring detailed accounts of 
both norm-specific and all-things-considered criticisability, to wit, Norm-Specific 
Criticisability, Norm-Specific Blamelessness, All-Things-Considered Blamelessness, and 
All-Things-Considered Criticisability/Blameworthiness. We then turned to a specific type 
of action, the speech act of assertion. In particular, we focused on a popular proposal 
concerning the epistemic norm of assertion, to wit, KRA, and a prominent objection to 
this view. The thought here is that cases of assertions on justified false belief and on 
gettiered belief show that KRA is too strong as the speakers violate KRA whilst, 
intuitively, walking free of blame. We have shown that our normative framework predicts 
that, whilst the speakers in these cases do indeed violate KRA, they do so blamelessly. In 
this way, we have shown that the standard response that champions of KRA have offered 
when presented with these counterexamples is borne out by our normative framework. As 
a result a prominent worry concerning the ad hoc-ness of this response can be dispelled.  
  Finally, we have argued that the putative counterexamples not only fail to provide 
evidence against KRA. On the contrary, once we take into consideration the patterns of 
criticisms and responses characteristically associated with action types that are/are not 
governed by rules like KRA, we find that these cases confirm KRA. In this way, the 
argument from these cases that foes of KRA have run against KRA can be turned on its 
head. Rather than posing a threat for KRA, they serve to strengthen the case for KRA.  
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